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ABSTRACT
 
Previous analyses of fat taxes have generally worked within an empirical framework in which it is difﬁcult to determine
 
whether consumers beneﬁt from the policy. This note outlines on simple means to determine whether consumers beneﬁt
 
from a fat tax by comparing the ratio of expenditures on the taxed good to the weight effect of the tax against the indivi­
dual’s willingness to pay for a one-pound weight reduction. Our empirical calculations suggest that an individual would
 
have to be willing to pay about $1500 to reduce weight by one pound for a tax on sugary beverages to be welfare enhancing.
 
The results suggest either that a soda tax is very unlikely to increase individual consumer welfare or that the policy must be
 
justiﬁed on some other grounds that abandon standard rationality assumptions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Given the rapid rise in obesity, academics and policymakers have proposed a variety of options to improve pub­
lic health. One of the most studied mechanisms is the fat tax, which uses the state’s taxing power to alter rel­
ative prices in an attempt to encourage healthier eating. Economists have been at the forefront of determining 
the effects of fat taxes, in large part because of the need to estimate demand elasticities to project consumption 
and weight changes. Examples of studies that have used demand estimates to simulate weight or health effects 
of fat taxes include those of Cutler et al. (2003), Cash et al. (2005), Kuchler et al. (2005), Chouinard et al. 
(2007), and Allais et al. (2009) among others (see Cash and Lacanilao, 2007, or Etilé, 2011, for reviews). 
Although such studies have provided important insights into the potential effects of fat taxes, they often stop 
short of explicitly calculating the welfare effects of a tax. These studies typically estimate price elasticities from 
demand curves, which are conceptually derived from constrained utility maximization, given prices and a bud­
get constraint. A difﬁculty arises from the fact that higher prices (from fat taxes) can only lower individual wel­
fare within this conventional framework; the estimated demand curves arise from a system in which utility and, 
thus, demand are unaffected by health or weight. Presumably, however, fat taxes are studied because of an un­
derlying belief that it is at least theoretically possible to improve consumer welfare by raising the prices of cer­
tain foods. Although many of the aforementioned studies allude to the potential existence of externalities asso­
ciated with public health care costs, such potential beneﬁts are outside the modeling framework used to 
estimate food demand. In short, previous economic work on fat faxes has lacked transparency in formally iden­
tifying the conditions under which fat taxes increase individual consumer welfare. 
*Correspondence to: Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74078, USA. E-mail: jayson. 
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The purpose of this note is to provide a simple framework to determine whether a fat tax improves consumer 
welfare at the individual level. We adopt the framework introduced by Philipson and Posner (1999) and further 
explored by Schroeter et al. (2008), who include weight as an argument of the utility function. We show the 
conditions under which a fat tax can increase consumer welfare within this framework and provide some em­
pirical calculations on whether a tax on sugary beverages increases welfare at the individual level. 
Our analysis does not rule out the possibility that a fat tax might be beneﬁcial at the societal level even if it is 
not at the individual if there are externalities (see Bhattacharya and Sood, 2011 for a discussion of this issue). 
Moreover, there are other frameworks that come from behavioral economics that could be used to describe how 
consumers might individually beneﬁt from a fat tax. Our objective here is to provide a simple framework that is 
internally consistent in so far as being able to analyze the effects of a fat tax in a situation where it is at least 
theoretically possible that consumers can beneﬁt from the policy. We touch on some of these other modeling 
alternatives in the conclusions. 
2. MODEL 
Following Schroeter et al. (2008), we use a simple two-good model where consumers derive utility from con­
suming a high-calorie food, FH, and a low-calorie food, FL, in addition to their weight, W. Weight is a function 
of the quantity of foods consumed and exercise, E: W =  W(FH , FL , E). Weight is increasing in food intake, 
@W/@F > 0 and decreasing in exercise, @W/@E < 0. The consumers’ utility function is U(W(FH , FL , E), FH , 
FL , E), which is increasing at a decreasing rate in FH and FL. Utility is assumed to be increasing in W at levels 
below an individual’s subjective, ideal weight, WI, and is decreasing thereafter. Given that the majority of peo­
ple in the USA are overweight, it is likely that @U/@W < 0 for most individuals. 
Consumers choose levels of food intake and exercise to maximize utility. Given prices of high-calorie and low-cal­
orie food, and exercise, PH , PL, and PE, and income, I, maximization leads to Marshallian demands for food and 
exercise, FH*(PH , PL , PE , I), FL*(PH , PL , PE , I), E*(PH , PL , PE , I), which can be substituted into the weight 
equation to determine economically optimal weight, W*(PH , PL , PE , I). The economically optimal weight W* 
may not necessarily coincide with the ideal weight WI or even weight that is optimal for the health of the individual. 
Substituting each of these functions back into objective function yields the indirect utility function: 
   
V PH ; PL; PE; I; W PH ; PL; PE; I :	 (1) 
Now, imagine a policy that implements an ad valorem tax of t to the high-calorie food, increasing the price 
from PH to PH(1 + t). The individual consumer welfare effects of the tax can be calculated by determining the 
consumer’s equivalent variation, EV, or the amount of money that must be added to income to make the con­
sumer indifferent to the tax hike. The welfare change is determined by the following equality: 
V Pð H ð1 þ tÞ; PL; PE; I þ EV ; W Pð H ð1 þ tÞ; PL; PE; I þ EVÞÞ¼ V PH ; PL; PE; I; W PH ; PL; PE; IÞÞ (2)ð ð 
The left-hand side of the equality in Equation (2) describes the consumer’s utility in the case where the fat 
tax is imposed and where EV has been added to income to offset the disutility of the tax, and the right-hand side 
represents the consumer’s utility in the status quo before implementing the fat tax. 
The welfare effects of the policy can be determined by taking a linear approximation around the equality in 
Equation (2) and re-arranging the terms: ! ( )-PH t @V @V @W*
EV ¼	 
@V þ @V@W* @PH þ @W* @PH : (3) @I @W*@I
Equation (3) shows that the welfare effects of a fat tax involve a trade-off between the disutility consumers receive 
from higher prices given by @
@
P
V 
H and the added utility individuals receive from decreasing body weight as a result 
  
  
  
@W* of the tax implementation, which is given by @V @PH . It is useful to consider the special case in which 
@W† ¼ 0,@W* @I 
which is likely to hold for small marginal changes in income. In this case, Equation (3) can be re-written as: 
! 
@V @V- @W* @PH @W* EV ¼ PH t - : (4)
@V @V @PH
@I @I 
@V-
Equation (4) can be further simpliﬁed by noting that the ﬁrst term in parentheses, @PH , is equal to FH* @V 
@I 
because of Roy’s identity, where the * superscript indicates utility maximizing levels. The second term in 
@V 
parentheses, @W*, is the marginal utility of weight gain divided by the marginal utility of income, which is equal @V
 
@I
 
to the individual’s willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce weight by one pound, WTPW, multiplied by negative 
one. Thus, Equation (4) can be re-written as follows: 
( (  )  )
@W* 
EV ¼ PH t FH* þ WTPW : (5)
@PH
Equation (5) shows that the welfare effects of a fat tax, as indicated by the level of compensation that must 
be given to an individual to offset the increased price, EV, is increasing in the size of the tax, t, and the con­
sumption level of the taxed good, FH*. However, EV is falling in WTPW because @W
* 
< 0. This means that with @PH 
this simple framework, in which weight is included as an argument in the utility function, it is possible to see 
how consumers could be made better off from the tax: a condition, which occurs if EV < 0 or if  FH* < 
@W* -WTPW . The higher the value an individual places on losing weight, the more likely is the condition @PH 
to hold. 
In a traditional economic model, weight is excluded as an argument of the utility function, which means 
Equation (5) reduces to PHFH* t, which is simply the change in expenditure on the high-calorie good resulting 
from the tax: a value, which can only be positive. That is, in the traditional economic framework, EV can only 
be positive, meaning consumers are worse off from the tax (they must be with compensated a positive dollar 
amount to offset the disutility of the tax). Equation (5) generalizes this result to allow the beneﬁts of weight loss 
to be balanced against the costs of the tax.1 
3. EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
@W* A fat tax is beneﬁcial to a consumer in this framework if FH* < -WTPW @PH . The ﬁrst term, FH*, is easily 
observed as it is an individual’s level of consumption of the high-calorie good. The weight reductions occurring 
from the price change, @W
* 
@PH , might initially appear difﬁcult to determine; however, Schroeter et al. (2008) show 
that the value can be straightforwardly calculated using own-price and cross-price elasticities of demand along 
with weight-consumption elasticities, which can be determined using energy accounting. In particular, their 
results imply that @W
* ¼ ð HH TH þ eLH TL þ eEH TEÞ W* HH is the own-price elasticity of demand for @PH e , where ePH 
the high-calorie food, e LHand e EHare cross-price elasticities of demand for low-calorie food and exercise with 
respect to the price of high-calorie food, and Tkis the percentage change in weight resulting from a 1% increase 
in consumption of good k = H, L, and E, high-calorie food, low-calorie food, and exercise, respectively. 
1Our model ignores any possible beneﬁts that might be derived from the income the government raises through taxation. Ultimately, one 
would have to conduct a cost–beneﬁt analysis on speciﬁc programs funded by the extra tax revenue to determine whether and to what ex­
tent they beneﬁt the individual. 
    
The term that is most uncertain in Equation (5), in the sense that there are not many well-established values 
in the literature, is an individual’s WTP for a one-pound weight reduction, WTPW. As such, it might be useful to 
use existing values of FH * and calculated values of @W
* 
@PH to infer the value of WTP
W that would be required for an 
individual to beneﬁt from the fat tax. Such a procedure can at least provide an intuitive feel for the likelihood of 
a fat tax being welfare enhancing and can be compared with existing evidence on the extent to which people 
value weight reduction (e.g. see Cawley, 2004, 2008; Narbo and Sjöström, 2000). 
Re-writing the welfare-enhancing condition in terms of weight WTP yields the following: ( )
@W* 
EV < 0 if WTPW > FH* = - ; (6)
@PH 
and substituting the equation for @W
* 
given above and rearranging yields our key result: @PH 
EV < 0 if WTPW > FH*PH = W eHH TH þ eLH TL þ eEH TE : (7) 
The numerator,FH*PH , is simply the expenditure on the high-calorie food, and the denominator, 
HH LH EHW(e TH + e TL + e TE), is the change in weight (in pounds) that results from a 1% increase in the price 
of the high-calorie food, PH . 
Equation (7) provides a convenient means of calculating whether a fat tax is welfare enhancing by employ­
ing the type of data that are normally used to simulate the weight effects of a fat tax. For example, consider the 
results in Dharmasena and Capps (2011) related to a tax on sugary sweetened beverages—a target of many fat 
tax advocates. Their results suggest that a 1% increase in the price of regular soft drinks, sports drinks, and fruit 
drinks would lead to a weight loss of 0.077 lbs annually at average consumption levels. 
Using Nielsen data from 2006, Zhen et al. (2011) reported that both low-income and high-income house­
holds spend, on average, a little less than $115/year on regular soft drinks, sports drinks, and fruit drinks. Plug­
ging the average values into Equation (7), we can see that the ‘average’ household would have to be willing to 
pay at least 115/0.077 = $1493 per pound of weight lost for a fat tax to improve their individual welfare.2 
There are other studies aside from that of Dharmasena and Capps (2011) that have estimated how consump­
tion of soft drinks varies with changes in drink prices such as Zhen et al. (2011) and Smith et al. (2010). Using 
the price elasticities provided in these alternative studies would, of course, lead to different estimates of the 
minimum welfare-enhancing WTP. One advantage of using the results provided by Dharmasena and Capps 
(2011) is that they translate the consumption changes to weight changes—providing the precise number needed 
to plug into the denominator of Equation (7). Although Dharmasena and Capps (2011) used a ﬂexible func­
tional form to estimate sugary drink demand, accounting for endogeneity of expenditures, and imposed theo­
retical restrictions such as symmetry and homogeneity, it should be noted that alternative functional forms or 
assumptions about demand interrelationships might lead to different results. 
According to Jensen’s inequality, a non-linear function evaluated at the mean will not equal the mean of the 
function. As a result, $1493 should not be interpreted as the mean WTP in a population of heterogeneous indi­
viduals. To provide some indication of the sensitivity of the estimate to variation in household expenditures on 
sugary beverages and to the uncertainty in the weight-loss effect from the fat tax, we constructed Table I and 
Figure 1. The data reported in Zhen et al. (2011) suggest that the SD of expenditures on regular soft drinks, 
sports drinks, and fruit drinks is at least $20/year. Thus, we calculate Equation (7) at 1 SD above and below 
the average of $115/year. There also is potential variability in the effects of a sugar tax. Dharmasena and Capps 
(2011) reported results for ‘heavy’ drinkers of sugary beverages, and their estimates imply that a 1% increase in 
the price of regular soft drinks, sports drinks, and fruit drinks would lead to a weight loss of 0.125 lbs annually 
2In this calculation, the numerator is expenditures in units of dollars per year. The denominator is the amount of weight lost in units of 
pounds per year. The division produces a measure in the units of dollars per pound. Time cancels out of the equation. In reality, the timing 
of the WTP (the cost) may not equal the timing of the weight loss (which happens over some period in the future). This is an issue we 
abstract away from in this paper. The statistics reported here can be thought of as the total amount one is willing to pay for an immediate, 
one-time weight loss. 
Table I. Relationship between minimum welfare-enhancing willingness to pay, weight impacts of a fat tax, and annual 
expenditures for the case of a tax on sugary beverages 
Willingness-to-pay per pound of 
Annual weight impacts from a 1% increase in Annual expenditures on weight loss needed for tax to 
Scenario price of sugary beveragesa sugary beveragesb enhance individual welfare 
1 Low (0.029-lb loss) Low ($95/year) $3276 
2 Average (0.077-lb loss) Low ($95/year) $1234 
3 High (0.125-lb loss) Low ($95/year) $760 
4 Low (0.029-lb loss) Average ($115/year) $3966 
5 Average (0.077-lb loss) Average ($115/year) $1494 
6 High (0.125-lb loss) Average ($115/year) $920 
7 Low (0.029-lb loss) High ($135/year) $4655 
8 Average (0.077-lb loss) High ($135/year) $1753 
9 High (0.125-lb loss) High ($135/year) $1080 
aAverage and high effects are inferred from the estimates in Dharmasena and Capps (2011). The low effect is calculated based on linear 
interpolation. 
bThe average expenditure is taken from Zhen et al. (2011). The high and low values are approximately 1 SD above and below the mean. 
for this group. We used linear interpolation between the mean effect (0.077 lbs/year) and the high effect 
(0.125 lbs/year) to calculate a ‘low’ weight effect of 0.077 – (0.125 – 0.077) = 0.029 lbs/year resulting from 
a 1% increase in the price of sugary beverages. 
As shown in Table I and Figure 1, the minimum welfare-enhancing WTP is highest for households 
spending the most on sugary beverages. However, WTP is relatively more inﬂuenced by the calculated 
weight effects of the tax. The more effective the tax is at reducing weight, the lower the minimum 
welfare-enhancing WTP. Even under the most optimistic scenario considered here (high weight effect 
and low expenditures), households would have to be willing to pay $760 per pound of weight lost for 
the policy to enhance their welfare. 
Systematic evidence on how much people are willing to pay to lose weight is sparse, but previous lit­
erature provides some indication of plausible values. Among a sample of obese individuals (with an 
average BMI of 39.6) in Sweden, Narbo and Sjöström (2000) asked a hypothetical open-ended question 
related to how much individuals were willing to pay ‘for a treatment that would relieve them from over-
weight-related problems’. The average value was $3280, and the median was $1330. The data in Narbo and 
Sjöström (2000) suggest that individuals in their sample would have to lose about 100 lbs to move from their 
current average BMI of 39.6 down to normal range BMI of 24.9 holding height constant. Thus, the per-pound 
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Figure 1. Relationship between minimum welfare-enhancing willingness to pay, weight impacts of a fat tax, and annual expenditures for 
the case of a tax on sugary beverages 
WTP for weight loss implied by Narbo and Sjöström (2000) is $32.80/lb at the average or $13.30/lb at the 
median. 
Cawley (2008) used a double-bounded dichotomous choice referendum question to ask New York resi­
dents how much they were willing to pay to ‘reduce youth obesity in your town by 50%’, The average 
WTP observed among their sample of respondents was $46.41/household/year. Although this statistic is 
informative and useful, it is impossible to put this ﬁgure on a per-pound of weight lost basis given that 
the question asked about WTP to reduce obesity in a group of individuals (of varying sizes and varying 
obesity rates). Moreover, the question asked about a ‘societal’ WTP, which might differ from the individ-
ual-WTP described by Equation (7). 
One ﬁnal piece of evidence related to people’s values for weight reduction comes from hedonic wage 
analysis. Several studies suggest that obese individuals receive wage discounts compared with normal 
weight individuals, and conceptually, someone should be willing to pay an amount at least as high as 
the wage discount associated with overweightedness. Among white female subjects, Cawley (2004) 
showed that an increase in weight of about 64 lbs from the mean is associated with a 9% wage decline. The 
average wage of female subjects in Cawley’s (2004) sample was about $8.40/hour (in 1998–1999). Thus, 
the implied wage-discount from being 64 lbs overweight is about $0.756/hour. For someone working 40 hours 
a week, 52 weeks a year, this amounts to $1572/year in lost income because of being 64 lbs overweight–or 
$24.57/lb/year. 
More work is needed to more accurately determine people’s WTP for weight reduction. However, the extant 
evidence cited above suggests that most people would not be willing to pay the ‘break even’ WTP value cal­
culated in relation to the sugary beverage tax, which was $1493 per lb of weight lost for an ‘average’ house­
hold. Stated differently, within the framework analyzed here, it is rather unlikely that a tax on sugary beverages 
would be welfare-enhancing at the individual level. 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This note provided a convenient means to determine whether a fat tax is welfare enhancing at the 
individual level. By including weight as an argument to the utility function, we show that a fat tax can 
be welfare enhancing if the amount individuals are willing to pay for a one-pound weight reduction is 
greater than the ratio of the expenditure on the taxed good to the weight loss produced by the tax. 
Our empirical calculations based on data and estimates in Dharmasena and Capps (2011) and Zhen 
et al. (2011) suggest that the ‘average’ household would have to be willing to pay about $1500 per pound of 
body weight lost for a tax on sugary beverages to be welfare enhancing at the individual level. What consumers 
are actually willing to pay for weight reduction is uncertain and is an area in need of additional research. Future 
studies along these lines would do well to precisely measure the amount of weight loss associated with the 
WTP amount. It also might be useful to determine whether WTP varies non-linearly with weight loss. Although 
$1500 seems like a large amount to pay to lose a single pound, it does not seem unreasonable to believe that 
some people might be willing to pay $15 000 over time to lose 10 lbs if the weight loss was permanent. 
The few existing studies on WTP for weight loss suggest that individuals are unlikely to be willing to part 
with $1500/lb of weight lost. This conclusion can be interpreted in one of two ways. First, one can conclude 
that the sugary beverage tax will not improve welfare within the individual-speciﬁc welfare context of the 
model developed in this paper. An alternative conclusion is that a soda tax policy would have to be justiﬁed 
on some other grounds. 
There are other conceptual models, which might be used to motivate a fat tax. For example, many ar­
gue that obesity causes an externality. Finkelstein et al. (2004), for example, calculate that each obese indi­
vidual increases the cost of Medicare by $1486, the cost of Medicaid by an extra $864, and private insurance by 
an additional $423 annually. Bhattacharya and Sood (2011) argue that most of the costs of obesity are borne at 
the individual level, casting some doubt on the externality argument; however, this is a matter that remains 
debatable in academic circles. If an externality exists, it might not have to be particularly large for a policy 
to be welfare enhancing because the deadweight loss of a tax can be offset by the mitigation of third-
party cost borne by the non-obese. A model arguing that the existence of externalities justiﬁes a fat 
tax would need to link the externality costs imposed on individuals to the offsetting beneﬁts from others’ 
weight reductions. 
An alternative modeling approach might rely on behavioral economics to motivate a fat tax. For exam­
ple, O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2000) argue that people have self-control problems when dealing with inter-
temporal decisions that involve choices between immediate beneﬁts (e.g. tasty food) and future costs (e.g. 
obesity). In such a model, a fat tax could serve to improve individual welfare by moving some of the future costs 
to the present. 
Although it is clearly possible to justify a fat tax by pointing to externalities of behavioral economics, the 
problem is that few authors have worked out the steps to actually empirically determine whether a fat tax is 
welfare enhancing within these frameworks. As fat taxes move closer to being actually implemented, it would 
seem imperative for authors to actually calculate the welfare consequences of a fat tax rather than making vague 
reference to a justiﬁcation based on externalities or behavioral economics. This note provided one simple 
framework in which such a calculation is possible. 
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